CVE-2026-112880

CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney

  • Low 2.1

Description

Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy. The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.

Key facts

Published
26 Oct 2026
Last changed
26 Oct 2026
Assigned by
EEF
EPSS
0.188% likely to be exploited in the next 30 days, higher than 8.507% of CVEs (scores for 17 Nov 2026)
SSVC (CISA)
Exploitation: none; Automatable: no; Technical impact: partial

Severity scores

Each score is shown as its source gave it. They are not averaged or merged.

  • 2.1CVSS 4.0, Lowfrom the CNA (EEF)CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

What to do

  • Check the value your proxy_auth_fun is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return {error, Reason} instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there.CNA workaround statement

Historical context and remediation

This reference retains the original CVE publication date. A recent record update does not mean a new attack occurred.

A party who controls what the application's proxy_auth_fun returns, for instance through the challenge headers of a proxy it can influence, can add header lines to the CONNECT request the client sends to its proxy. (CNA impact statement)

Version statuses below come from the CNA. An “unaffected” version is not necessarily a currently supported release or proof of a patch date. EPSS is a dated risk estimate, not a count of historical attacks.

Read the original CVE record.

Affected products

VendorProductVersions
benoitchackney
  • Default status: unaffected
  • 2.0.0 up to but excluding 4.9.0 (affected)
benoitchackney
  • Default status: unaffected
  • 5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5 up to but excluding 5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9 (affected)

Timeline

  1. 26 Oct 2026 Published

Weakness

References