CVE-2026-114232

Keycloak-services: keycloak-services: uma protection api resourcetype field not validated — cross-owner resource access

  • High 8.1

Description

A flaw was found in the UserManagedPermissionService of the Keycloak authorization server. The UMA Protection API, which manages user permissions, fails to validate the resourceType field when a user creates a new policy. This allows an attacker to create a policy that applies to resources owned by other users, potentially leading to unauthorized access or modification of sensitive data across the entire realm.

Key facts

Published
5 Nov 2026
Last changed
6 Nov 2026
Assigned by
redhat
EPSS
0.406% likely to be exploited in the next 30 days, higher than 35.429% of CVEs (scores for 16 Nov 2026)
SSVC (CISA)
Exploitation: none; Automatable: no; Technical impact: total

Severity scores

Each score is shown as its source gave it. They are not averaged or merged.

  • 8.1CVSS 3.1, Highfrom the CNA (redhat)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

What to do

  • Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-06) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to enforce ownership validation on the resourceType field within UserManagedPermissionService to prevent UMA policies from attaching to resources owned by other users: upgrade to Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.17, 26.6.8 (or the fixed Rhbk/Keycloak Rhel/Keycloak Services builds), which validates the resourceType field during policy creation in UserManagedPermissionService to prevent policies from matching resources across different owners during evaluation in DefaultPolicyEvaluator, closing crafted UMA policy creation specifying an arbitrary victim resourceType. Until patched, this is a concern on Keycloak deployments exposing the UMA Protection API where authenticated realm users have permission to create and manage resources, so Restrict authenticated users from creating and managing resources, limit exposure of sensitive resourceType iCNA workaround statement

Historical context and remediation

This reference retains the original CVE publication date. A recent record update does not mean a new attack occurred.

No separately sourced impact summary is available on this page yet. Consult the description, version data and dated exploitation evidence.

Version statuses below come from the CNA. An “unaffected” version is not necessarily a currently supported release or proof of a patch date. EPSS is a dated risk estimate, not a count of historical attacks.

CNA context is abbreviated; consult the original record for the complete statements.

Read the original CVE record.

Affected products

VendorProductVersions
Red HatRed Hat build of Keycloak 26.4
  • Default status: affected
  • 26.4.17-2 up to but excluding * (unaffected)
Red HatRed Hat build of Keycloak 26.4
  • Default status: affected
  • 26.4-29 up to but excluding * (unaffected)
Red HatRed Hat build of Keycloak 26.4
  • Default status: affected
  • 26.4-30 up to but excluding * (unaffected)
Red HatRed Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.17
  • Default status: unaffected
Red HatRed Hat build of Keycloak 26.6
  • Default status: affected
  • 26.6.8-2 up to but excluding * (unaffected)
Red HatRed Hat build of Keycloak 26.6
  • Default status: affected
  • 26.6-24 up to but excluding * (unaffected)
Red HatRed Hat build of Keycloak 26.6
  • Default status: affected
  • 26.6-24 up to but excluding * (unaffected)
Red HatRed Hat build of Keycloak 26.6.8
  • Default status: unaffected
Red HatRed Hat build of Keycloak 26.6.8
  • Default status: unaffected
Red HatRed Hat Single Sign-On 7
  • Default status: unaffected

Timeline

  1. 19 Oct 2026 Reported to Red Hat.
  2. 5 Nov 2026 Made public.
  3. 5 Nov 2026 Published

Weakness

References