CVE-2026-119446
Session fixation in the CLI login flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a user's API token
- Critical 9.4
Description
Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/<token> returns it to whoever started the login. The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3.
Key facts
- Published
- 10 Nov 2026
- Last changed
- 12 Nov 2026
- Assigned by
- EEF
- EPSS
- 0.468% likely to be exploited in the next 30 days, higher than 41.072% of CVEs (scores for 15 Nov 2026)
- SSVC (CISA)
- Exploitation: poc; Automatable: no; Technical impact: total
Severity scores
Each score is shown as its source gave it. They are not averaged or merged.
- 9.4CVSS 4.0, Criticalfrom the CNA (EEF)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
What to do
- Upgrading does not revoke tokens already handed out. A token from a CLI login is an ordinary API token with a note the client chose, so one an attacker obtained looks like any other. After upgrading, users should review their API tokens on the account page and delete any they do not recognise.CNA solution statement
- Block POST /api/auth/cli_session at the reverse proxy until the upgrade. It is the only entry point that creates a CLI login, so no link can be produced while it is blocked. CLIs can still sign in with an email and password (nh user auth, POST /api/users/auth), or use an API token created on the account page.CNA workaround statement
Historical context and remediation
This reference retains the original CVE publication date. A recent record update does not mean a new attack occurred.
An attacker with no account obtains an API token for any NervesHub user they can persuade to open a link and click Confirm. The token acts as that user through the API in every organization they belong to, at their role, until the user deletes it on the account page. Signing out of the web does not revoke it. (CNA impact statement)
Version statuses below come from the CNA. An “unaffected” version is not necessarily a currently supported release or proof of a patch date. EPSS is a dated risk estimate, not a count of historical attacks.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| nerves-hub | nerves_hub_web |
|
| nerves-hub | nerves_hub_web |
|
| nerves-hub | nerves_hub_web |
|
Timeline
- 10 Nov 2026 Published