CVE-2026-120307

Beta9 container escape via unvalidated sandbox file paths

  • Critical 9.9

Description

The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.

Key facts

Published
1 Nov 2026
Last changed
2 Nov 2026
Assigned by
JFROG
EPSS
0.484% likely to be exploited in the next 30 days, higher than 42.243% of CVEs (scores for 16 Nov 2026)
SSVC (CISA)
Exploitation: none; Automatable: no; Technical impact: total

Severity scores

Each score is shown as its source gave it. They are not averaged or merged.

  • 9.9CVSS 3.1, Criticalfrom the CNA (JFROG)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

What to do

  • Upgrade the Beta9 worker to 0.1.756 or later. Sandbox file APIs and workspace sync use os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory segments and symbolic links stay inside the container root or the mount source. File operations refuse read-only mounts and do not write through a symlink swapped in after path resolution. The fix is commit a28bf12 (pull request 1897), released as worker-0.1.756 on 2026-09-15.CNA solution statement

Historical context and remediation

This reference retains the original CVE publication date. A recent record update does not mean a new attack occurred.

No separately sourced impact summary is available on this page yet. Consult the description, version data and dated exploitation evidence.

Version statuses below come from the CNA. An “unaffected” version is not necessarily a currently supported release or proof of a patch date. EPSS is a dated risk estimate, not a count of historical attacks.

Read the original CVE record.

Affected products

VendorProductVersions
beam-cloudBeta9 worker
  • Default status: unaffected
  • 0 up to but excluding 0.1.756 (affected)

Timeline

  1. 15 Sep 2026 Fix merged in pull request 1897 (commit a28bf12)
  2. 15 Sep 2026 Fixed release worker-0.1.756 published. No vendor security advisory was filed with the pull request.
  3. 1 Nov 2026 Published

Weakness

Practice this bug class

HackZoneLabs has a hands-on lab on Path traversal (CWE-22).

References