CVE-2026-98996

fs: don't silently unmount busy mounts

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: don't silently unmount busy mounts The propagate_mount_busy() helper exists to decide whether a synchronous can suceed. It does that by looking at the copies of the victims in the mounts its parent propagates to. One of those functions from propagation hell. It skips a copy that has child mounts except for the case of a single child mount covering the copy's root. That algorithm used to be exact. It isn't anymore. Originally only childless copies were unmounted during propagation. And 1064f874abc0 ("mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.") ended up adding covered mounts to both sides in one go. Along came 99b19d16471e ("mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts in any order") and that started to unmount more than before: [1]: A copy of a mount is unmounted when each of its children is either its overmount or a copy of the victim itself. In the former case the overmount gets reparented. In the latter case the copy of the victim will end up being unmounted. So propagate_umount() ended up being rewritten without adjusting propagate_mount_busy(). And currently propagate_mount_busy() doesn't look at copies of the victim that have two or more children nor a single child that is not the overmount. So any such copy in [1] is not checked for references. The result is that a synchronous unmount succeeds, pulling out a mount that is still in use. A container can run into this with its own mounts. The host shares a tree with the container and the host has a mount in that tree: mount -t tmpfs none /mnt mount --make-shared /mnt mount -t tmpfs none /mnt/a The container's /mnt is a slave copy of the host mount. The container now takes a detached copy of the tree and mounts that copy beneath its propagated copy of /mnt/a and keeps the file descriptor to the tree open: unshare -m --propagation unchanged mount --make-rslave / fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE) move_mount(fd, "", AT_FDCWD, "/mnt/a", MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH) grep /mnt /proc/self/mountinfo 775 355 ... /mnt ... master:646 777 775 ... /mnt/a ... master:646 776 777 ... /mnt/a ... master:647 778 777 ... /mnt/a/a ... master:647 The now attached tree (777) is now mounted beneath the container's copy of /mnt/a. That's also where the host mount sits (as seen from the host mount namespace). So the propagated copy (776) of the host's mount is on top of its root and the copy of that (778) is inside it. Now the host runs: umount /mnt/a and it succeeds. The moved tree tree and the copy inside of it are gone from the container. Now only the propagated copy is left and it got reparented to where it was before: grep /mnt /proc/self/mountinfo 775 355 ... /mnt ... master:646 776 775 ... /mnt/a ... But the file descriptor still refers to the moved tree. So a synchronous umount detached a mount that is still in use. Teach propagate_mount_busy() the same checks that propagate_umount() does. It now checks for a single victim mount without children for which it can assume that MNT_LOCKED is cleared on every copy like propagate_umount() does. The copies form chains. IOW, when a copy itself receives propagation from the victim's parent then the mount at the same mountpoint inside that copy is a copy as well. Whether a mount receives propagation from the victim's can simply be checked by walking its masters. Walk each chain once from its top so we are sure that nested copies stay linear. Check every reference once of every copy that gets unmounted.

Key facts

Published
23 Oct 2026
Last changed
10 Nov 2026
Assigned by
Linux
EPSS
0.168% likely to be exploited in the next 30 days, higher than 6.248% of CVEs (scores for 17 Nov 2026)

Historical context and remediation

This reference retains the original CVE publication date. A recent record update does not mean a new attack occurred.

No separately sourced impact summary is available on this page yet. Consult the description, version data and dated exploitation evidence.

No explicit remediation statement is available on this page yet. Consult the original record and vendor references before choosing a fix.

Version statuses below come from the CNA. An “unaffected” version is not necessarily a currently supported release or proof of a patch date. EPSS is a dated risk estimate, not a count of historical attacks.

Read the original CVE record.

Affected products

VendorProductVersions
LinuxLinux
  • Default status: unaffected
  • 99b19d16471e9c3faa85cad38abc9cbbe04c6d55 up to but excluding 97c9ca40b67eafbe61a253e28cd51dddb7c6bec4 (affected)
  • 99b19d16471e9c3faa85cad38abc9cbbe04c6d55 up to but excluding bf2c8dec26fb792876b5e9bde7030c45d8be3908 (affected)
  • 99b19d16471e9c3faa85cad38abc9cbbe04c6d55 up to but excluding a210ac218c307513d43e98a08f23c2dfbeeebc2f (affected)
  • 99b19d16471e9c3faa85cad38abc9cbbe04c6d55 up to but excluding 6857e209015f95be7a8f19a9cd5dac345b9b9859 (affected)
  • dc5ce95b0252d143497283f7f659840d4f8a79d0 (affected)
  • fdb8f10499924d96b8eb60cc1354b278f6fcf0e9 (affected)
  • bb4fbf094b440a9209ed88c8681960d4b26eec0f (affected)
  • b43f81ef0babcc07db1eaaece37c989204e4ff00 (affected)
  • 81311d1698c0c87c972ba71d3ce44a617b52ea21 (affected)
  • 4.1.43 up to but excluding 4.2 (affected)
  • 4.4.78 up to but excluding 4.5 (affected)
  • 4.9.39 up to but excluding 4.10 (affected)
  • 4.11.12 up to but excluding 4.12 (affected)
  • 4.12.3 up to but excluding 4.13 (affected)
LinuxLinux
  • Default status: affected
  • 4.13 (affected)
  • 0 up to but excluding 4.13 (unaffected)
  • 6.12.117 up to and including 6.12.* (unaffected)
  • 6.18.57 up to and including 6.18.* (unaffected)
  • 7.2.11 up to and including 7.2.* (unaffected)
  • 7.3 up to and including * (unaffected)

Timeline

  1. 23 Oct 2026 Published

References