Rapid7 chains five ONLYOFFICE Docs bugs from view-only access to container root
Rapid7 says a viewer with no edit or download rights could reach root inside the official DocumentServer container. ONLYOFFICE confirmed the five findings were fixed in Document Server 10.0.
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Rapid7 published five ONLYOFFICE Docs findings on November 16, 2026, along with proof-of-concept code. The headline claim is that someone holding view-only access to a document can chain the bugs into arbitrary command execution as root inside the official DocumentServer container. ONLYOFFICE confirmed on October 23, 2026 that all five were fixed in Document Server 10.0, and the changelog describes the release's security changes.
Rapid7 found the bugs while researching Zimbra Collaboration Suite, which integrates with ONLYOFFICE. Testing ran on the official onlyoffice/documentserver:9.4.0 image with package onlyoffice-documentserver 9.4.0-129, as the ds account, with JWT validation left on and no vendor code modified. Exploitation was demonstrated only on that build. Rapid7 says the broader affected-version range is unknown.
What the chain does
The entry point is a JWT mix-up. In the tested build, the default-secret branch of getTenantSecret() hands the same configured signing key to Browser and Inbox tokens. The /docbuilder endpoint checks incoming requests against the Inbox key, so a view-only Editor JWT passes the signature check even though it was never issued for DocBuilder. From there, a DocBuilder script can call GetFontBinary() with an absolute path and get the file's bytes back. In the tested build that exposed the Session JWT signing key, which let the attacker forge tokens carrying document keys and permissions the original viewer never had.
Rapid7 notes the native file read itself was reported earlier by Ssani4 in DocumentBuilder issue #147 on November 21, 2025, and ONLYOFFICE closed that as fixed in DocumentBuilder 9.2.0. Rapid7 reproduced it in 9.4.0-129 through the view-only Editor JWT.
The second stage is a write. The Document Builder API mishandles converter XML passed through the optional third argument of builder.SaveFile(). A duplicate m_sFileTo element overrides the server-generated output path, so content lands outside the job directory. That's enough to overwrite runtime.json, change the Document Builder executable path and arguments, and get commands run when the next Document Builder job is processed. A separate path traversal in complete-save format handling gives another arbitrary file write.
The last step is local privilege escalation. The documentserver-flush-cache.sh maintenance helper interpolates a crafted --hash argument into a GNU sed expression without validation, and sed's e flag runs it. The packaged sudoers policy lets ds run that helper as root without a password and with unrestricted arguments.
There's also a quieter bug. An authenticated view-only user can reconnect with a valid Session JWT while swapping in an attacker-controlled callback URL, which the Session JWT doesn't bind, then call sendForm over RPC. DocumentServer sends a reconstructed DOCX to that URL, including custom XML, custom document properties and field instruction text the viewer never saw, even with download and form-filling disabled.
HackZoneLabs assessment
The severity here depends on the deployment, and the report is honest about that. The tested path needs a valid Editor JWT for some document, which means an integrating application has to be handing them out, and it needs /docbuilder reachable. Rapid7 also flags a conditional unauthenticated route: with WOPI enabled and an attacker-controlled source that the WOPI IP filter permits, the same DocBuilder authorization failure is the way in. The shipped WOPI filter defaults to allow-all, which is the part we'd look at first on any internet-facing install.
The privilege escalation is the least interesting bug on its own and the most useful in a chain. A sudoers rule that lets a service account run a shell script as root with arbitrary arguments is a standing invitation, and the sed e flag turns a hash string into a command line. That's a design choice, not a slip.
The data-exposure finding is the one that will get missed. Teams tend to treat view-only as safe and assume download controls cover the rest. Here the reconstructed export carried custom XML, custom properties and field instructions that were never rendered, so a document can leak material nobody in the review chain knew was in it.
We'd treat 10.0 as the fix and not spend time on partial mitigations. Rapid7's own testing stopped at 9.4.0-129, so we wouldn't assume anything about which earlier builds are exploitable, and we wouldn't assume they aren't.
What's still unknown
Nobody has published evidence of these bugs being used in the wild, and Rapid7's post doesn't claim any. The affected-version range below 9.4.0-129 is unestablished. Whether the default-secret branch that lets a Browser-signed token pass Inbox validation exists in every configuration isn't spelled out either; Rapid7 describes it as the tested build's behaviour.
For defenders, the order is short. Get to Document Server 10.0. Then check whether /docbuilder is reachable from anywhere it doesn't need to be, and whether WOPI is on with the default allow-all filter. Then look at what the ds account can read, since the file read only worked because the signing key sat in a file ds could open.
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